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Does the Dark Triad of Personality
Predict Corrupt Intention? The
Mediating Role of Belief in Good Luck
Huanhuan Zhao, Heyun Zhang and Yan Xu*
School of Psychology, Beijing Normal University, Beijing, China
The current study is the first attempt to examine the association between the Dark
Triad of personality (i.e., Machiavellianism, narcissism, and psychopathy) and corruption
through a mediator—belief in good luck. Based on Ajzen’s theory of planned behavior, we
assumed that individuals with Dark Triad would bemore likely to engage in corruption as a
result of belief in good luck. In Study 1, a set of hypothetical scenarios was used to assess
the bribe-offering intention and the corresponding belief in good luck. Results indicated
that while the Dark Triad of personality positively predicted bribe-offering intention, it
was mediated by the belief in good luck in gain-seeking. In Study 2, we presented
participants with some hypothetical scenarios of bribe-taking and the corresponding
belief in good luck. Findings revealed that the Dark Triad of personality was positively
related to bribe-taking intention; the relationship between narcissism and bribe-taking
intention, and that between psychopathy and bribe-taking intention was mediated by
the belief in good luck in penalty-avoidance. However, this belief in good luck did not
mediate the relationship between Machiavellianism and bribe-taking intention. These
results hold while controlling for demographic variables, dispositional optimism, and
self-efficacy. Taken together, this study extended previous research by providing evidence
that belief in good luck may be one of the reasons explaining why people with Dark Triad
are more likely to engage in corruption regardless of the potential outcomes. Theoretical
and practical implications were discussed.
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INTRODUCTION
Corruption exists widely. It is commonly defined as deviant behavior that deliberately breaks
legal or moral norms and abuses public authority or resources for personal gain (He, 2000;
Lindgreen, 2004; Rabl and Kuhlmann, 2008). It impairs political stability, damages economic
growth, misallocates public resources, hinders normal upward social mobility, increases social
inequality, undermines people’s trust in government, and lowers moral standards in a society (He,
2000; Lu and Gunnison, 2003; Alesina and Angeletos, 2005; Sobhani and Bechara, 2011). Since
corruption harms a society tremendously, a thorough understanding of it followed by the proper
counter measures becomes extremely important.
When it comes to corruption, the following important questions are often raised first: What
kinds of people are more likely to act corruptly? What type of personality they possess that leads
them to gain profits form corruption at the expense of others? Why do these people tend to engage
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in corruption more often than others? Though previous research
tried to uncover the occurrence of corruption at both macro
(Treisman, 2000; Blackburn and Forgues-Puccio, 2009) and
micro level (Jaber-López et al., 2014), and found that corruption
was a result of interactions among various variables (e.g.,
political, social, economic, or psychological factors), yet to date,
little research has explored the wider range of personality traits
potentially associated with corrupt behaviors. A growing body
of evidence suggested that the Dark Triad of personality (i.e.,
Machiavellianism, narcissism, and psychopathy) was associated
with unethical behaviors (Egan et al., 2015; Azizli et al., 2016;
Roeser et al., 2016).We reckoned that this associationmay extend
to corrupt behaviors. Thus, the first purpose of this study is
to examine whether people with Dark Triad are more likely to
engage in corruption.
Furthermore, despite the increasing evidence justifying the
effects of the Dark Triad traits on various deviant behaviors,
scant attention has been given to the underlying mechanism
and processes through which this relationship occurs. Therefore,
the second purpose of this study is to explore the psychological
mechanism that underlies the association between theDark Triad
traits and corruption. According to Ajzen’s theory of planned
behavior, behavioral dispositions, such as personality traits and
social attitudes, played a critical role in predicting cognitive
beliefs (e.g., behavioral beliefs, normative beliefs, and control
beliefs), which in turn explain human behaviors (Fishbein and
Ajzen, 1975; Ajzen, 1991). Ajzen (1991) proposed that personality
traits influenced behavior indirectly through cognitive beliefs.
Belief in good luck, as an irrational cognitive belief, thus may be
affected by one’s particular personality trait. Additionally, belief
in good luck has been proved to shape one’s behaviors (Chiu
and Storm, 2010). Accordingly, we assume that the relationship
between the Dark Triad of personality and corruption is
mediated by belief in good luck.
The Dark Triad of Personality and
Corruption
The Dark Triad consists of three antisocial personality traits:
Machiavellianism, narcissism, and psychopathy (Paulhus and
Williams, 2002). Machiavellianism is portrayed as calculated
manipulation, duplicity, cunningness, and a disregard for
morality (Hodson et al., 2009; Rauthmann and Kolar, 2013;
Djeriouat and Tremoliere, 2014). Narcissism is characterized by
optimistic egotism (Jones, 2013), and is positively correlated with
self-centeredness, sense of superiority, entitlement, vanity, and
grandiosity (Crysel et al., 2013; Rauthmann and Kolar, 2013;
Buelow and Brunell, 2014). Narcissists often pursue immediate
profits at the expense of others’ interests (Lakey et al., 2008;
Foster et al., 2009). Psychopathy is linked to high impulsivity,
callousness, and socially aversive behaviors (Hodson et al., 2009;
Rauthmann and Kolar, 2013). According to the life history
theory, individuals with Dark Triad manifest the fast life strategy
characterized by a disregard for social rules, short-term thinking,
and extensive future-discounting related behaviors (Jonason
et al., 2010, 2012). These traits are positively related to numerous
deviant behaviors like gambling (Jones and Figueredo, 2013),
lying and deception (Azizli et al., 2016), cyber-aggression (Pabian
et al., 2015), and white-collar crime (Egan et al., 2015). Since
corruption is a deviant behavior and can be a criminal offense
(Rabl and Kuhlmann, 2008), we posit that the Dark Triad of
personality may be positively associated with corrupt behaviors.
Additionally, corruption is based on the exchange between
at least two partners, i.e., the bribe giver and taker strike a
deal, often by putting their personal interests ahead of others’
(Rabl and Kuhlmann, 2008). Research indicated that people with
Dark Triad fit this description. Each trait in Dark Triad may
have a unique set of features, but all three have something
in common as well. First, all three traits are related to the
willingness to gain profit at the expense of others (Jones, 2013).
Individuals who exhibit high Dark Triad tendencies employ
devious means to achieve personal goals with little concern for
others’ interests (Linton and Power, 2013). Second, the common
features of the Dark Triad, such asmanipulation, callousness, and
selfishness, positively predict deliberate toxic behaviors (O’Boyle
et al., 2012; Jones and Figueredo, 2013). Machiavellians often
manipulate others for personal gain, against others’ welfare (Tang
et al., 2008). Narcissists are relentless and toxic when they have
power (Schmidt, 2008). A recent study found that individuals
with psychopathy share many behavioral characteristics observed
in patients suffering from ventromedial prefrontal cortex and
amygdala lesions. This finding served as a neuroscientific
evidence to explain why psychopaths engage in corrupt and
immoral behaviors (Sobhani and Bechara, 2011). Therefore,
considering the generally antisocial and socially undesirable
nature of the Dark Triad traits, we made an assumption that the
Dark Triad traits would predict greater intention to engage in
corruption (Hypothesis 1).
The Mediating Role of Belief in Good Luck
As pointed out previously, people with Dark Triad may tend
to engage in corrupt behaviors. The question is, what motivates
these “Dark Triad” people to ignore the law and involve in
corruption? According to the theory of planned behavior, belief
in good luck can provide a new perspective to look at the reasons
behind the Dark Triad people engaging in corruption.
Belief in Good Luck
We can easily observe in daily life the following phenomena:
some people cannot stop a gambling game, for they believe that
they will have a good luck to win the game, and the good luck
makes them believe that their chance of winning will be high (e.g.,
70%), despite the actual winning probability is very low (e.g., 5%)
and they have lost many times. Or, some people believe that they
will have a good luck which makes them not being caught or have
low chances of being caught (e.g., 5%) if they cheat just once in
an examination, despite the actual probability of being caught is
very high (e.g., 60%) and many cheaters have been caught. This
irrational belief, often closely related to the negative or deviant
behaviors, is named “belief in good luck” in this study. Belief in
good luck is an irrational cognition about luck (Day and Maltby,
2003). It can increase ones’ unrealistic optimism and self-efficacy
(Darke and Freedman, 1997a; Damisch et al., 2010), and affect
their future expectations (Darke and Freedman, 1997b).
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Belief in good luck is often manifested as blindness in
making decisions on probability events, especially with reference
to the events involving deviant behaviors (Chiu and Storm,
2010). It should be noted that there are two outcomes of
negative or deviant behaviors: positive-valence and negative-
valence outcomes. In the above examples, people are attracted
to the deviant behaviors of gambling and cheating through
different mechanisms. While the former involves overrating the
probability of a positive-valence outcome (i.e., winning the game)
despite its actual probability is low, the latter involves underrating
the probability of a negative-valence outcome (i.e., being caught)
despite its actual probability is high. If the actual probability of a
positive-valence outcome is very low and the actual probability
of a negative-valence outcome is very high, but people still
irrationally believe that they will have a good luck, and the
corresponding good luck makes them irrationally believe that
they are more likely to experience a positive-valence outcome
and less likely to experience a negative-valence outcome, then
this is the effect of what we call “belief in good luck.” When
good luck was thought of as a personal quality possessed by
persons, it could provide a perceived ability that can be used
to exert control over what otherwise may consider a chance
event (Wohl and Enzle, 2002). Accordingly, belief in good luck
exerts its influence on negative or deviant behavior via two
mechanisms: (1) irrationally overestimating the probability of
a positive-valence outcome when its actual probability is very
low; and (2) irrationally underestimating the probability of a
negative-valence outcomewhen its actual probability is very high.
Obviously, the operational definition of belief in good
luck is somewhat similar to the prospect theory, which also
emphasizes decision-making and probability estimation (Tversky
and Kahneman, 1981, 1992). The prospect theory suggests that
people tend to overrate the small probabilities and underrate the
moderate and large probabilities regardless of the nature of the
event (e.g., good or deviant behavior) and the valence of the
event outcome (i.e., positive or negative valence; Tversky and
Kahneman, 1981, 1992; Kusev et al., 2009). Nevertheless, belief in
good luck takes into account of the outcome valence of deviant
event as well as its actual probability. Additionally, we should
point out that it is plausible to make the inference that when
the probability of a positive-valence outcome is very high, people
may still overrate it, and when the probability of a negative-
valence outcome is very low, people may still underrate it, despite
the respective degrees of overestimation and underestimation
may be very small. It is reasonable and natural for people to
expect that they will experience a positive-valence outcome when
its probability is very high and will not suffer from a negative-
valence outcome when its probability is very low. Evidently, these
two cases not only contradict the prospect theory (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1981, 1992), but also in line with people’s rational
expectations, therefore, are not considered as an irrational belief
in good luck.
Based on the prospect theory and the operational definition
of belief in good luck, we used the adapted research paradigm
of “objective probability event-subjective probability estimation”
to measure one’s belief in good luck in corruption. Here the
objective probability event means the actual probability of
deviant event outcomes, whereas the subjective probability
estimation means people’s irrational overestimation and
underestimation. We also employed two different outcome
valences of the forms of corruption in this study to verify the
related mechanisms of belief in good luck. As to bribe-offering,
in order to gain unfair advantages over others, one may offer
a bribe to someone who is in power. However, in China, since
bribe-offering is legally much less penalized than bribe-taking
(Wang and Wu, 2012), we focused on the likelihood of seeking
gains via bribe-offering (a positive-valence outcome of deviant
behavior). We contended that some people may have the lucky
belief and tend to irrationally overestimate the probability of
seeking personal advantages via bribe-offering (namely belief
in good luck in gain-seeking) (Study 1). Additionally, since
bribe-taking behaviors in China face much more severe penalties
and involvement in bribe-taking is becoming increasingly risky
(Gong, 2002; Lu and Gunnison, 2003), the factor to focus on
here is the probability of being penalized in bribe-taking (a
negative-valence outcome of deviant behavior). We speculated
that some people may hold the lucky belief and have a tendency
to irrationally underestimate the likelihood of being penalized
for bribe-taking (namely belief in good luck in penalty-avoidance)
(Study 2).
The Dark Triad of Personality and Belief in Good Luck
The theory of planned behavior suggests that personality traits
play an important role in predicting cognitive beliefs (Fishbein
and Ajzen, 1975; Ajzen, 1991). People’s personality influences
how they perceive and evaluate things around them (Andre, 2006;
Jibeen, 2015). If a personality trait toward cognitive irrationality
is rooted largely in innate or biological differences, it is more
likely to result in irrational beliefs (Andre, 2006; Yang et al.,
2007; Samar et al., 2013; Jibeen, 2015). For example, the Big-five
personality traits have been proven to predict people’s irrational
beliefs (Samar et al., 2013; Jibeen, 2015). As important personality
characteristics, the Dark Triad traits were closely associated with
Big-five personality traits (Lee and Ashton, 2005), thus suggesting
that the latter would also predict and affect individuals’ irrational
and unrealistic beliefs. A series of compelling studies support our
inference (Paulhus and Williams, 2002; Lakey et al., 2008; Jones,
2014; Birkas et al., 2015).
Research has shown that high Machiavellianism was
associated with greater perceived reward for engaging in
deviant behavior and less perceived punishment for that activity
(Birkas et al., 2015). This indicates that Machiavellians tend
to consider merely the profits they want to pursue, which
may result in their erroneous estimation about the odds of
rewards or punishment (Rauthmann and Kolar, 2013; Birkas
et al., 2015). They may form unrealistic beliefs about good
luck, and irrationally overrate the gain-seeking probability
and underrate or even neglect the punishment probability.
Additionally, individuals with high narcissism often possess
a sense of entitlement (Morf et al., 2000) and overconfidence
(Campbell et al., 2004), which lead them to misjudge the chances
of success. In other words, they may inappropriately raise the
subjective probabilities of successes (Paulhus and Williams,
2002). Besides, the inflated self-beliefs caused narcissists to
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form an unrealistic view that luck always works in their favor,
which make them underrate the probability of risks or losses
and arrive at irrational decisions (Judge et al., 2006; Chatterjee
and Hambrick, 2007; Lakey et al., 2008). As such, people with
high narcissism may hold the illusory beliefs that good luck
would fall to them and they can control an event. Results from
previous research also demonstrated that psychopathy was
positively associated with irrational beliefs (Samar et al., 2013);
people high in psychopathy tend to exhibit a biased judgment
of risk perceptions, or even ignore the inherent risks related
to an event (Jones, 2014). In addition, the characteristic of
low self-control renders them unable to resist the temptations
from unfair advantages, which cause them unable to keep a
cool mind to make rational judgments (Tangney et al., 2004).
Indeed, all of these would exacerbate the “Dark Triad” people’s
unrealistic estimations about potential gains or risks. Taken
together, it is nature to assume that when faced with deviant
behaviors, individuals with high Dark Triad would be more
likely to hold irrational beliefs in good luck and make irrational
estimations.
Belief in Good Luck and Corruption
Ajzen’s theory of planned behavior also indicated that individuals’
cognitive beliefs about a behavior are considered as the prevailing
determinants of their behavioral tendencies (Fishbein and
Ajzen, 1975; Ajzen, 1991). Additionally, a number of cognitive-
behavioral theories suggested that the deviant behaviors are
caused by inaccurate or irrational beliefs (Ellis, 1999; Andre,
2006; Jibeen, 2015). Although, a previous study has suggested
that beliefs about luck can serve as a positive expectation for
future events to a certain degree (Darke and Freedman, 1997a),
when confronted with antisocial and unethical behaviors, such as
corruption, this irrational belief will lead to serious consequences.
Research has shown that belief in good luck generated the feelings
of illusion of control and optimistic bias (Darke and Freedman,
1997a,b), and these unrealistic feelings were prevalent amongst
gambling and risk-taking behaviors (Darke and Freedman,
1997b; Chiu and Storm, 2010). For example, the gamblers’
perception of themselves being lucky led them to continue
gambling (Wohl and Enzle, 2003; Chiu and Storm, 2010); and
the lower perceived likelihood of punishment lead people to
have a higher perceived corrupt intention (Bai et al., 2014).
Therefore, as to corruption, under the influence of lucky belief,
irrationally overestimating the likelihood of seeking personal
benefits via bribe-offering, and inappropriately underestimating
the likelihood of being penalized for bribe-taking, would together
make people have a strong tendency to engage in bribe-offering
and bribe-taking behaviors. Thus, engaging in corruption is, at
least to some degree, dependent upon one’s irrational beliefs in
good luck in seeking gains or avoiding penalty. We then propose
that the more people believe in good luck, the more likely they
would be to engage in corruption.
Given that belief in good luck is closely linked to the Dark
Triad of personality and corrupt behaviors, based on the theory
of planned behavior, it is reasonable to hypothesize that belief in
good luck may play a mediating role in the relationship between
the Dark Triad traits and corrupt intention (Hypothesis 2).
Overview of the Current Studies
Based on the literature review of previous theories and studies,
we posited the following two hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: The Dark Triad traits positively predict corrupt
intention; and
Hypothesis 2: Belief in good luck plays a mediating role in
the relationship between the Dark Triad traits and corrupt
intention.
We conducted two sub-studies in China to test Hypothesis 1
and Hypothesis 2. In these sub-studies, bribe-offering and bribe-
taking were used as two different outcome valences of the forms
of corruption in hypothetical scenarios, and the measurement
of belief in good luck was embedded in the corresponding
scenario. In Study 1, we explored the correlations between each
Dark Triad trait and bribe-offering intention, and constructed
mediation models to verify the assumption that belief in good
luck in seeking gains (irrationally overestimating the probability
of a positive-valence outcome) would mediate the effect of the
Dark Triad traits on bribe-offering intention. In Study 2, we
further examined whether each Dark Triad trait could facilitate
bribe-taking intention, and tested whether belief in good luck in
avoiding penalty (irrationally underestimating the probability of
a negative-valence outcome) wouldmediate the effect of the Dark
Triad traits on bribe-taking intention.
STUDY 1
The aim of Study 1 was twofold. First, we examined whether
the Dark Triad traits could predict bribe-offering intention. We
expected that individuals with high Dark Triad traits were more
likely engage in bribe-offering behaviors. Second, we explored
whether one’s belief in good luck can mediate the effects of
the Dark Triad traits on bribe-offering intention. We predicted
that individuals with Dark Triad tend to engage in corruption
partially because they hold the lucky belief and irrationally
overestimate the likelihood of seeking gains via bribe-offering.
Methods
Participants
A total of 404 Chinese adults were recruited online, via the
Qualtrics Survey from different enterprises in China. The final
valid sample comprised 395 Chinese adults (231 female and
164 male; Mage = 29.56 years, SD = 6.30 years; age range: 18–
60 years), as 9 adults were excluded because 4 of them failed
to complete the questionnaires, and 5 responded with extreme
values. The effective response rate was 97.77%. Participants
varied considerably in terms of their education levels (18.2% with
high school education or less, 31.4% with a college degree, 42.0%
with a bachelor degree, and 8.4% with a postgraduate degree)
and monthly income (14.4% with less than 2000 yuan, 49.1%
with 2001–5000 yuan, 24.6% with 5001–8000 yuan, 9.1% with
8001–20,000 yuan, and 2.8% with more than 20,000 yuan).
Procedure
After signing a consent form, the participants completed a
series of self-report questionnaires within 45 mins. These
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questionnaires included the Short Dark Triad scale, the bribe-
offering intention measure, the belief in good luck measure, the
life orientation test revised and the new general self-efficacy scale.
After they completed the questionnaires, the participants were
asked to provide demographic information, including gender,
age, education level and monthly income. Upon completion,
participants were thanked and debriefed. Anonymity of the
participants was ensured in order to reduce social desirability,
and all procedures were approved by the ethics board at the
School of Psychology, Beijing Normal University.
Measures
The short Dark Triad (SD3)
Following Jones and Paulhus (2014) methods, the 27-item Dark
Triad scale was translated via a back-translation procedure and
then was used to assess the Dark Triad personality traits. This
scale is divided into three dimensions: Machiavellianism (e.g.,
“Make sure your plans benefit yourself, not others”), narcissism
(e.g., “People see me as a natural leader”) and psychopathy (e.g.,
“I like to get revenge on authorities”). Each sub-scale comprises
9 items. Participants were asked to rate their level of agreement
with each item on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree,
5 = strongly agree). Higher scores on the scale indicate higher
levels of Dark Triad tendencies. In this study, the Cronbach’s
α for the total scale was 0.87, and that for Machiavellianism,
narcissism and psychopathy was 0.71, 0.78, and 0.78, respectively.
A confirmatory factor analysis also showed a good fit for the
measurement model (χ2/df = 1.83, GFI = 0.91, CFI = 0.90,
RMSEA = 0.05). The results of reliability and validity analyses
indicated that this scale was applicable to a Chinese sample.
The bribe-offering scenario
Participants were asked to read three hypothetical daily life
scenarios on bribe-offering, which were generated from a panel
discussion (see Supplementary Material). Each participant read
the following instructions before the task: “Please vividly imagine
that you are in each situation.” The following is a sample of a
bribe-offering scenario:
“Suppose you are a section-level employee who has a strong
desire to gain a promotion. The municipal government is
currently selecting and promoting one section chief. You are in a
disadvantaged position in the competition compared with other
section-level candidates. Before the final decision, you ask the
deputy mayor to help you and plan to privately promise him a
certain sum of money as a token of your thanks if you win in
the competition. You are aware that winning the competition via
offering a bribe is an unlawful behavior.”
After each scenario, propensity to engage in bribe-offering was
assessed by instructing the participants to “Please estimate the
likelihood you would offer the bribe to someone who is in charge”
on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = extremely unlikely, 7 = extremely
likely). The index of bribe-offering intention was calculated as
the average score of the three scenarios, where a higher score
indicates greater intention of bribe-offering. The Cronbach’s α of
this tool was 0.80.
Belief in good luck
In this study, we adopted the research paradigm of “objective
probability event-subjective probability estimation” to measure
one’s belief in good luck related to corruption. After each bribe-
offering scenario, there was a corresponding scenario to measure
one’s belief in good luck in gain-seeking. The following is a sample
of such a scenario related to the previously presented example of
a bribe-offering scenario:
“Suppose you have offered a bribe to the deputy mayor privately.
According to some recent studies related to this scenario, the
probability of securing a promotion via bribe-offering is only
about 5% in recent years. Please respond to the following two
items: (1) Despite the low probability, however, you still definitely
believe that you will have a good luck to gain promotion when
you offer the bribe; (2) The good luck makes you believe that your
winning probability will be significant higher than 5% when you
offer the bribe.”
Participants responded to each item on a 7-point Likert scale
(1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). Three scenarios were
averaged together to create an indicator of belief in good luck,
where higher scores were indicative of higher levels of belief in
good luck. The Cronbach’s α of this tool was 0.79. It is important
to note that according to the statistical probability, the 5% rate
that was used in the scenarios present in this study was a very low
probability event.
Control variables
We included gender, age, education, income, dispositional
optimism, and self-efficacy as control variables that potentially
influenced the findings. For example, research has suggested
that gender, age, education, and income significantly affect
corruption (Cˇábelková and Hanousek, 2004; Donchev
and Ujhelyi, 2007). Moreover, optimism and self-efficacy
were positively associated with belief in good luck (Darke
and Freedman, 1997a; Damisch et al., 2010). Therefore,
these variables were assessed and controlled to isolate
the independent impacts of the Dark Triad traits and
belief in good luck on corrupt intention in our following
analyses.
The 10-item Life orientation test revised measure was used
to evaluate the participants’ level of dispositional optimism
(Scheier et al., 1994). Six items were used to assess optimism
(e.g. “I’m always optimistic about my future”) and four
items used as filler items were not scored. All items were
rated on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5
= strongly agree), with higher scores indicating a greater
degree of dispositional optimism. The Cronbach’s alpha was
0.83.
Self-efficacy was measured using the 8-item new general self-
efficacy scale (Chen et al., 2001). One sample item is “In general,
I think that I can obtain outcomes that are important to me”.
Participants completed these items on a 5-point Likert scale
(1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree), with higher scores
representing a greater degree of generalized self-efficacy. The
Cronbach’s alpha was 0.88.
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Results
Discriminant Validity
To examine the discriminant validity of belief in good luck,
we conducted a confirmatory factor analysis on belief in good
luck, dispositional optimism, and self-efficacy. Results showed
that a three-factor model provided a good fit to the data
[χ2
(116, N = 395)
= 278.45, p < 0.001, GFI = 0.92, CFI = 0.93,
RMSEA = 0.06], all factor loadings were statistically significant,
with standardized loadings ranging from 0.60 to 0.80. Model fit
was significantly better for the three-factor model compared with
a single-factor model [1χ2
(3, N = 395)
= 998.50, p< 0.001], a two-
factor model that combined belief in good luck and dispositional
optimism into one factor [1χ2
(2, N = 395)
= 336.43, p < 0.001],
and a two-factor model that combined belief in good luck and
self-efficacy into one factor [1χ2
(2, N = 395)
= 343.23, p< 0.001].
Descriptive Analyses
Means, standard deviations, and zero-order correlation
coefficients among the variables have been presented in
Table 1. As hypothesized, the results showed that there were
significant correlations between each Dark Triad trait, belief
in good luck, and bribe-offering intention. More specifically,
Machiavellianism, narcissism, and psychopathy were positively
correlated with both belief in good luck and bribe-offering
intention.
Testing the Mediating Role of Belief in Good Luck in
the Relationship between the Dark Triad Traits and
Bribe-Offering Intention
In order to test Hypothesis 1 that the Dark Triad traits would
predict corrupt intention, we first entered the control variables
and then the three Dark Triad traits in the hierarchical regression
analysis. The results showed thatMachiavellianism (β = 0.30, p<
0.001, 95% CI [0.22, 0.39]), narcissism (β = 0.15, p < 0.01, 95%
CI [0.04, 0.25]), and psychopathy (β = 0.15, p < 0.01, 95% CI
[0.05, 0.25]) were positive predictors of bribe-offering intention.
Thus, Hypothesis 1 was supported, indicating that people with
higher levels of the Dark Triad tendencies were likely to exhibit a
higher corrupt intention.
To explain the psychological process underlying the effects
of the Dark Triad traits on corrupt intention, we conducted
regression analyses according to the specification set out by
Andrew Hayes’ (2013) PROCESS for SPSS using Model 4 (a
bootstrapping CI method with N = 5000 bootstrap samples)
to test the mediation effect of belief in good luck on the
relationship between the Dark Triad traits and corrupt intention.
The mediation effects were statistically significant when the 95%
confidence intervals did not include zero. To yield standardized
coefficients, all variables were converted to z-scores prior to
analysis. As illustrated in Tables 2–4 and Figures 1–3, after
adjusting for the control variables, belief in good luck in gain-
seeking was found to mediate the associations between each Dark
Triad trait and bribe-offering intention. Thus, Hypothesis 2 was
confirmed.
When Machiavellianism was the independent variable, the
link between Machiavellianism and bribe-offering intention was
significantly mediated by belief in good luck in seeking gains
(βindirect = 0.06, SE = 0.02, 95% CI [0.03, 0.10]), as depicted in
Table 2 and Figure 1.
When narcissism was the independent variable, we found that
the relationship between narcissism and bribe-offering intention
was fully mediated by belief in good luck in seeking gains
(βindirect = 0.09, SE = 0.02, 95% CI [0.05, 0.14]), as depicted in
Table 3 and Figure 2.
When psychopathy was the independent variable, the results
indicated that belief in good luck in seeking gains partially
mediated the relationship between psychopathy and bribe-
offering intention (βindirect = 0.04, SE = 0.02, 95% CI [0.01,
0.08]), as depicted in Table 4 and Figure 3.
Discussion
The results supported Hypothesis 1 and 2, demonstrated that the
Dark Triad traits foster corruption and this effect was mediated
by belief in good luck. The association between narcissism and
bribe-offering intention was fully mediated by belief in good luck,
TABLE 1 | Descriptive statistics and correlations among the variables.
Variables M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1. Gender 0.58 0.49 −
2. Age 29.56 6.30 −0.02 −
3. Education 2.41 0.88 0.05 −0.10* −
4. Income 2.37 0.93 −0.13* 0.12* 0.27*** −
5. Optimism 3.37 0.66 −0.02 −0.04 0.05 0.004 −
6. Self-efficacy 3.54 0.65 −0.12* 0.12* 0.03 0.07 0.13** −
7. Machiavellianism 3.19 0.58 −0.13* −0.10 0.04 0.05 0.13* 0.12* −
8. Narcissism 2.80 0.66 −0.18*** −0.19*** 0.11* 0.08 0.14** 0.16** 0.46*** −
9. Psychopathy 2.42 0.65 −0.18*** −0.14** 0.003 −0.02 0.12* 0.07 0.34*** 0.63*** −
10. BIGL 4.14 1.24 −0.16** 0.04 0.06 0.10* 0.12* 0.10* 0.26*** 0.33*** 0.17** −
11. BOI 3.90 1.45 −0.13* −0.07 0.04 0.07 0.16** 0.10 0.34*** 0.20*** 0.19*** 0.33*** −
BIGL, Belief in good luck; BOI, Bribe-offering intention. Gender was dummy coded as 0 =male and 1 = female. Education was coded as 1 = high school education or less, 2 = college
degree, 3 = bachelor degree and 4 = postgraduate degree. Monthly income (CNY) was coded as 1 = under 2000, 2 = 2001–5000, 3 = 5001–8000, 4 = 8001–20,000 and 5 = above
20,000. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
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TABLE 2 | Test the mediation effect of Belief in good luck on the link between Machiavellianism and Bribe-offering intention (N = 395).
Predictors Belief in good luck Bribe-offering intention
β t 95%CI β t 95%CI
Gender −0.12* −2.48 [−0.22, −0.03] −0.04 −0.95 [−0.14, 0.05]
Age 0.06 1.15 [−0.04, 0.15] −0.06 −1.30 [−0.15, 0.03]
Education 0.05 0.90 [−0.05, 0.15] −0.01 −0.11 [−0.10, 0.09]
Income 0.05 1.06 [−0.05, 0.15] 0.03 0.59 [−0.07, 0.12]
Optimism 0.09 1.74 [−0.01, 0.18] 0.09 1.87 [−0.005, 0.18]
Self-efficacy 0.04 0.72 [−0.06, 0.13] 0.03 0.69 [−0.06, 0.13]
Machiavellianism 0.23*** 4.60 [0.13, 0.33] 0.25*** 5.11 [0.15, 0.34]
Belief in good luck 0.25*** 5.16 [0.15, 0.34]
R2 0.10 0.20
F 6.39*** 11.69***
Each column set is a regression equation that predicts the criterion at the top of the column. *p < 0.05; ***p < 0.001.
TABLE 3 | Test the mediation effect of Belief in good luck on the link between Narcissism and Bribe-offering intention (N = 395).
Predictors Belief in good luck Bribe-offering intention
β t 95%CI β t 95%CI
Gender −0.10* −2.03 [−0.19, −0.003] −0.06 −1.18 [−0.15, 0.04]
Age 0.10 1.94 [−0.002, 0.19] −0.08 −1.57 [−0.18, 0.02]
Education 0.03 0.56 [−0.07, 0.13] −0.01 −0.13 [−0.10, 0.09]
Income 0.05 0.90 [−0.05, 0.14] 0.03 0.63 [−0.07, 0.13]
Optimism 0.08 1.60 [−0.02, 0.17] 0.10* 2.15 [0.01, 0.20]
Self-efficacy 0.02 0.30 [−0.08, 0.11] 0.05 0.96 [−0.05, 0.14]
Narcissism 0.31*** 6.16 [0.21, 0.41] 0.06 1.09 [−0.05, 0.16]
Belief in good luck 0.29*** 5.69 [0.19, 0.39]
R2 0.14 0.14
F 8.92*** 8.05***
Each column set is a regression equation that predicts the criterion at the top of the column. *p < 0.05; ***p < 0.001.
TABLE 4 | Test the mediation effect of Belief in good luck on the link between Psychopathy and Bribe-offering intention (N = 395).
Predictors Belief in good luck Bribe-offering intention
β t 95%CI β t 95%CI
Gender −0.12* −2.41 [−0.22, −0.02] −0.05 −0.97 [−0.14, 0.05]
Age 0.05 1.04 [−0.05, 0.15] −0.07 −1.53 [−0.17, 0.02]
Education 0.05 0.97 [−0.05, 0.15] −0.002 −0.05 [−0.10, 0.10]
Income 0.07 1.26 [−0.04, 0.17] 0.04 0.75 [−0.06, 0.14]
Optimism 0.10 1.91 [−0.003, 0.19] 0.10* 2.06 [0.004, 0.19]
Self-efficacy 0.05 1.02 [−0.05, 0.15] 0.05 1.02 [−0.05, 0.14]
Psychopathy 0.14** 2.85 [0.04, 0.24] 0.11* 2.15 [0.01, 0.20]
Belief in good luck 0.29*** 5.95 [0.19, 0.39]
R2 0.07 0.15
F 4.41*** 8.56***
Each column set is a regression equation that predicts the criterion at the top of the column. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
while the effects of Machiavellianism and psychopathy on bribe-
offering intention were both partially mediated by belief in good
luck. Individuals with Dark Triad tended to be driven by personal
goals and interests (Jonason andWebster, 2012), even at a cost to
other people. They held good luck beliefs and overestimated their
chances of seeking unfair advantages via bribe-offering, and may
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FIGURE 1 | Indirect effect of belief in good luck on the link between Machiavellianism and bribe-offering intention. ***p < 0.001.
FIGURE 2 | Indirect effect of belief in good luck on the link between narcissism and bribe-offering intention. **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
judge that one cannot succeed in the competition without bribe-
offering and that the benefit of winning the competition clearly
outweighs the cost of bribe-offering.
Study 1 mainly focused on one mechanism related to belief
in good luck, that is, people with the Dark Triad traits tended
to overestimate the probability of positive-valence outcomes.
However, it was unclear how they would react when faced with
the negative-valence outcomes of corruption, such as penalty.
To further explore the mediating role of belief in good luck, we
conducted Study 2.
STUDY 2
In Study 2, we used a different context and sample to examine
the association between each of the Dark Triad traits and bribe-
taking intention, and examined the mediating role of belief in
good luck in this relationship. We speculated that individuals
with Dark Triad tend to engage in bribe-taking behaviors
partially because they hold the lucky belief and irrationally
underestimate the likelihood of being penalized for bribe-taking.
Methods
Participants
A total of 386 Chinese adults were recruited online, via the
Qualtrics Survey from different enterprises in China. The final
valid sample size was 382 Chinese adults (193 female and 189
male; Mage = 28.19 years, SD = 5.66 years; age range: 18–63
years), as 4 adults were excluded because they failed to complete
the questionnaires. The effective response rate was 98.96%.
Participants varied considerably in terms of their education
levels (12.8% with high school education or less, 39.3% with a
college degree, 43.5% with a bachelor degree, and 4.5% with a
postgraduate degree) and monthly income (8.4% with less than
2000 yuan, 48.4% with 2001–5000 yuan, 30.9% with 5001–8000
yuan, 9.4% with 8001–20,000 yuan, and 2.9% with more than
20,000 yuan).
Procedure
The study procedure was the same as that employed in Study 1.
Measures
The short Dark Triad (SD3)
The 27-item Dark Triad was used, as in Study 1. In this study,
the Cronbach’s α for the total scale was 0.87, and that for
Machiavellianism, narcissism, and psychopathy was 0.78, 0.81,
and 0.77, respectively.
The bribe-taking scenario
We adapted bribery scenarios successfully used in past research
(Bai et al., 2014). Participants were exposed to three hypothetical
daily life scenarios about bribe-taking (see Supplementary
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FIGURE 3 | Indirect effect of belief in good luck on the link between psychopathy and bribe-offering intention. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
Material). The experimental procedure was the same as that
employed in Study 1. The following is a sample of the bribe-
taking scenario:
“Suppose you are a director who is in charge of bidding.
Compared to other bidders, Company A is in an unfavorable
position in the competition. In order to win the bid, the CEO
of Company A asks you to help him, and also privately promises
you a certain sum of money if his company wins the bid. If you
help him, the probability that he will win the bid will be greatly
improved. But you are aware that it is against the law to help him
win the bid by accepting a bribe.”
After each scenario, propensity to engage in bribe-taking was
measured by “Please estimate the likelihood that you would
offer the help to Company A” on a 7-point Likert scale (1 =
extremely unlikely, 7 = extremely likely). The index of bribe-
taking intention was calculated as the average score of the three
scenarios, where higher scores are indicative of greater bribe-
taking intention. The Cronbach’s α of the tool was 0.85.
Belief in good luck
The research paradigm of “objective probability event-subjective
probability estimation” was used, same as in Study 1. After
each bribe-taking scenario, there was a corresponding scenario
to measure one’s belief in good luck in penalty-avoidance. The
following is a sample scenario that corresponds to the example
illustrated in the bribe-taking scenario:
“Suppose you have accepted the bribe that the CEO of Company
A offered to you and helped him to win the bid. According to the
statistics of the national department related to this scenario, the
probability of penalty for bribe-taking in bidding is almost 40%
in recent years. Please respond to the following two items: (1)
Despite the high probability, however, you still definitely believe
that you will have a good luck to avoid penalty; (2) The good luck
makes you believe that your probability of being penalized will be
significant lower than 40% even if you take the bribe.”
Participants responded to each item on a 7-point Likert scale
(1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). The average of three
scenarios comprised the score of belief in good luck. The higher
the averaged score, the higher is the level of belief in good luck.
The Cronbach’s α of this tool was 0.89. Additionally, we should
note that though China is currently ramping up efforts to fight
corruption, the results of a pilot investigation show that the
penalty rate in corruption cases is just about 10%, and the 40%
rate that was presented in the scenarios used in this study is a
very high penalty rate.
Control variables
We controlled the same variables as in Study 1. The Cronbach’s α
of the 10-item Life orientation test revised measure and the new
general self-efficacy scale was 0.81, and 0.88, respectively.
Results
Discriminate Validity
The procedure to test the discriminant validity of belief in
good luck was the same as that employed in Study 1. Results
demonstrated that the three-factor model was better fit the data
[χ2(116, N = 382) = 335.88, p < 0.001, GFI = 0.90, CFI = 0.92,
RMSEA = 0.07] than the single-factor model [χ2(3, N = 382)
= 1188.22, p < 0.001], the two-factor model that combined
belief in good luck and dispositional optimism into one factor
[1χ2(2, N = 382) = 636.56, p < 0.001], and the two-factor model
that combined belief in good luck and self-efficacy into one factor
[1χ2(2, N = 395) = 645.50, p< 0.001].
Descriptive Statistics
Table 5 displays the descriptive statistics and zero-order
correlation coefficients among the variables. As expected,
narcissism, and psychopathy were positively correlated with
belief in good luck and bribe-taking intention. Interestingly,
Machiavellianismwas positively related to bribe-taking intention,
but was not significantly linked to the corresponding belief in
good luck.
Testing the Mediating Role of Belief in Good Luck in
the Relationship between the Dark Triad Traits and
Bribe-Taking Intention
While controlling the control variables, Machiavellianism (β =
0.24, p < 0.001, 95% CI [0.15, 0.34]), narcissism (β = 0.13, p
< 0.05, 95% CI [0.03, 0.25]), and psychopathy (β = 0.25, p <
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TABLE 5 | Descriptive statistics and correlations among the variables.
Variables M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1. Gender 0.51 0.50 −
2. Age 28.19 5.66 −0.04 −
3. Education 2.40 0.77 −0.12* 0.05 −
4. Income 2.50 0.88 −0.27*** 0.04 0.30*** −
5. Optimism 3.36 0.73 −0.04 −0.04 0.07 −0.06 −
6. Self-efficacy 3.51 0.69 −0.04 0.05 0.05 0.12* 0.11* −
7. Machiavellianism 3.20 0.67 −0.17** −0.08 0.11* 0.02 0.14** 0.14** −
8. Narcissism 2.90 0.69 −0.20*** −0.05 0.16** 0.07 0.13** 0.14** 0.44*** −
9. Psychopathy 2.46 0.67 −0.18*** −0.11* 0.11* 0.04 0.15** 0.04 0.37*** 0.54*** −
10. BIGL 3.56 1.72 −0.18*** 0.05 0.11* 0.13* 0.12* 0.10* 0.09 0.26*** 0.18*** −
11. BTI 3.09 1.56 −0.18*** −0.18** 0.01 0.08 0.14** 0.04 0.28*** 0.18*** 0.30*** 0.32*** −
BIGL, Belief in good luck; BTI, Bribe-taking intention. Gender was dummy coded as 0 = male and 1 = female. Education was coded as 1 = high school education or less, 2 = college
degree, 3 = bachelor degree and 4 = postgraduate degree. Monthly income (CNY) was coded as 1 = under 2000; 2 = 2001–5000; 3 = 5001–8000; 4 = 8001–20,000; and 5 = above
20,000. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
0.001, 95% CI [0.15, 0.34]) was positively predicted bribe-taking
intention. Thus, Hypothesis 1 was verified again.
We then examined whether belief in good luck in penalty-
avoidance mediated the effect of each Dark Triad trait on bribe-
taking intention. Similar to that in Study 1, the Model 4 of the
Hayes’ PROCESSmacro for SPSS was adopted (Hayes, 2013). The
results have been illustrated in Tables 6–8 and Figures 4–6.
When Machiavellianism was the independent variable, the
results showed that belief in good luck in penalty-avoidance
did not mediate the relationship between Machiavellianism and
bribe-taking intention (βindirect= 0.01, SE= 0.02, 95%CI [−0.02,
0.05]), as depicted in Table 6 and Figure 4.
When narcissism was the independent variable, the
relationship between narcissism and bribe-taking intention
was fully mediated by belief in good luck in penalty-avoidance
(βindirect = 0.06, SE = 0.02, 95% CI [0.03, 0.11]), as depicted in
Table 7 and Figure 5.
When psychopathy was the independent variable, the results
demonstrated that belief in good luck in penalty-avoidance
partially mediated the relationship between psychopathy and
bribe-taking intention (βindirect = 0.04, SE = 0.02, 95% CI [0.01,
0.07]), as depicted in Table 8 and Figure 6.
Discussion
These results reconfirmed Hypothesis 1 and showed that the
Dark Triad traits were positively associated with corruption.
Additionally, Hypothesis 2 was partially verified. The effect
of narcissism on bribe-taking intention was fully mediated
by belief in good luck, whereas the effect of psychopathy
was partially mediated by belief in good luck. This indicates
that “dark” individuals’ exaggerated beliefs in good luck may
engender a false sense of control (Darke and Freedman,
1997a,b), which may cause them to ignore the real risks of
bribe-taking and underestimate the odds of an unfavorable
consequence. Interestingly, however, belief in good luck
in penalty-avoidance did not mediate the relationship
between Machiavellianism and bribe-taking intention. The
calculated strategy of Machiavellianism may help us explain this
result.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
It is important to note that very few studies have examined the
mediating role of irrational beliefs in good luck between the
Dark Triad of personality and corruption. Our results indicated
that the three Dark Triad traits significantly contributed to
explaining the variance in corrupt intention. More importantly,
the mediating effects suggest that people with Dark Triad
are more likely to engage in corruption, partially due to
their belief in good luck. In other words, they tend to
overestimate the likelihood of seeking gains via bribe-offering
and underestimate the likelihood of being penalty for bribe-
taking irrationally.
Consistent with the theory of planned behavior (Fishbein
and Ajzen, 1975; Ajzen, 1991), the Dark Triad of personality
predicted the irrational behavioral beliefs in good luck, which in
turn, affected one’s corrupt intention. While the Chinese central
government has begun prioritizing anti-corruption work and has
drastically intensified anti-corruption campaigns, engagement in
corruption, especially bribe-taking, has become increasingly risky
(Gong, 2002). In Chinese legal sanctions of corruption, engaging
in bribe-taking will be penalized severely, whereas bribe-offering
may be punished leniently or may even be exempted from
investigation (Lu and Gunnison, 2003; Wang and Wu, 2012).
Additionally, in the daily social norms of China, people often
adopt double standards toward bribe-taking and bribe-offering
behaviors. For example, after bribery cases are exposed, people
often express their condemnation toward bribe recipients, but
show less negativity toward bribe payers. Accordingly, in Study
1, in order to gain an unfair advantage, people with a dark
personality were found to tend to overestimate the probability
of seeking gains via bribe-offering, which led them to have
a tendency to engage in corruption. In Study 2, when faced
with a severe penalty for bribe-taking in China, people with
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TABLE 6 | Test the mediation effect of Belief in good luck on the link between Machiavellianism and Bribe-taking intention (N = 382).
Predictors Belief in good luck Bribe-taking intention
β t 95%CI β t 95%CI
Gender −0.14** −2.63 [−0.24, −0.03] −0.09 −1.89 [−0.19, 0.003]
Age 0.04 0.82 [−0.06, 0.14] −0.17*** −3.61 [−0.26, −0.08]
Education 0.06 1.06 [−0.05, 0.16] −0.07 −1.51 [−0.17, 0.02]
Income 0.07 1.21 [−0.04, 0.17] 0.05 1.03 [−0.05, 0.15]
Optimism 0.10* 2.01 [0.002, 0.20] 0.07 1.49 [−0.02, 0.16]
Self-efficacy 0.07 1.32 [−0.03, 0.17] −0.02 −0.50 [−0.12, 0.07]
Machiavellianism 0.04 0.80 [−0.06, 0.14] 0.23*** 4.82 [0.14, 0.32]
Belief in good luck 0.28*** 5.93 [0.19, 0.37]
R2 0.06 0.21
F 3.67*** 12.62***
Each column set is a regression equation that predicts the criterion at the top of the column. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
TABLE 7 | Test the mediation effect of Belief in good luck on the link between Narcissism and Bribe-taking intention (N = 382).
Predictors Belief in good luck Bribe-taking intention
β t 95%CI β t 95%CI
Gender −0.11* −2.03 [−0.21, −0.004] −0.12* −2.33 [−0.22, −0.02]
Age 0.05 1.03 [−0.05, 0.15] −0.18*** −3.84 [−0.28, −0.09]
Education 0.03 0.62 [−0.07, 0.13] −0.06 −1.18 [−0.16, 0.04]
Income 0.07 1.29 [−0.04, 0.17] 0.04 0.79 [−0.06, 0.14]
Optimism 0.09 1.72 [−0.01, 0.18] 0.09 1.80 [−0.01, 0.18]
Self-efficacy 0.05 0.95 [−0.05, 0.15] −0.002 −0.05 [−0.10, 0.09]
Narcissism 0.21*** 4.16 [0.11, 0.31] 0.08 1.48 [−0.02, 0.17]
Belief in good luck 0.28*** 5.52 [0.18, 0.37]
R2 0.10 0.17
F 6.21*** 9.48***
Each column set is a regression equation that predicts the criterion at the top of the column. *p < 0.05; ***p < 0.001.
TABLE 8 | Test the mediation effect of Belief in good luck on the link between Psychopathy and Bribe-taking intention (N = 382).
Predictors Belief in good luck Bribe-taking intention
β t 95%CI β t 95%CI
Gender −0.12* −2.31 [−0.22, −0.02] −0.10 −1.95 [−0.19, 0.001]
Age 0.05 1.07 [−0.04, 0.15] −0.16*** −3.46 [−0.25, −0.07]
Education 0.05 0.90 [−0.06, 0.15] −0.07 −1.39 [−0.16, 0.03]
Income 0.07 1.24 [−0.04, 0.17] 0.04 0.88 [−0.06, 0.14]
Optimism 0.09 1.77 [−0.01, 0.19] 0.07 1.47 [−0.02, 0.16]
Self-efficacy 0.07 1.38 [−0.03, 0.17] 0.002 0.97 [−0.09, 0.09]
Psychopathy 0.14** 2.65 [0.04, 0.24] 0.21*** 4.33 [0.11, 0.31]
Belief in good luck 0.26*** 5.45 [0.17, 0.36]
R2 0.08 0.20
F 4.64*** 11.95***
Each column set is a regression equation that predicts the criterion at the top of the column. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
high narcissism and psychopathy tended to underestimate or
even ignore the penalty odds, which drove them to engage
in corruption. However, the strategic nature of Machiavellians
protects them from generating an irrational belief in good luck in
avoiding penalty, such that they only accept bribes whenminimal
or no threat of penalty exists.
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FIGURE 4 | Indirect effect of belief in good luck on the link between Machiavellianism and bribe-taking intention. ***p < 0.001.
FIGURE 5 | Indirect effect of belief in good luck on the link between narcissism and bribe-taking intention. *p < 0.05; ***p < 0.001.
In line with Hypothesis 1, Machiavellianism positively
predicts corruption. Machiavellians employ manipulative,
exploitive, and devious methods to achieve private goals
and make unethical choices if chances for benefit emerge
(Gunnthorsdottir et al., 2002; Birkas et al., 2015). However, one
inconsistency in the results is that, in Study 1, Machiavellianism
was positively related to belief in good luck in seeking gains,
whereas, in Study 2, Machiavellianism was less correlated with
belief in good luck in avoiding penalty. In hindsight, these results
appear to be consistent with previous theories presented in
the Machiavellianism literature. Specifically, recent empirical
evidence has shown that Machiavellians were sensitive to rewards
(Birkas et al., 2015), likely making reward-oriented decisions,
and thus overrating the benefits and probability of gaining an
unfair advantage derived from bribe-offering, positively linking
to their irrational belief in good luck, which, in part, fuels their
tendency to engage in corruption. Perhaps, not surprisingly,
Machiavellians only accept bribes when there is maximal benefit
with minimal punishment (Jones, 2013). That is, they strategize
to maximize their long-term gains (Jones, 2013), and only
involve in some cautious misbehaviors. However, since bribe-
taking behavior attracts a severe legal penalty in China (Lu and
Gunnison, 2003), it may bring in minor benefits in a short period
of time but at the expense of significant costs in the long run.
With stronger detecting and evaluating abilities, Machiavellians
will carefully estimate the potential risk to their own interests
(Birkas et al., 2015), and thus may not engender the irrational
beliefs in good luck in avoiding penalty. These results are exactly
in line with previous evidence thatMachiavellianism is associated
with anti-social behaviors only when there is no or little risk
of being caught (Jones, 2013). Accordingly, Machiavellianism
has little correlation with an irrational belief in underestimating
the probability of penalty for bribe-taking. These findings about
Machiavellianism may be an interesting area for future research.
Obviously, it is reasonable to argue that individuals with high
narcissism tend to engage in corruption because they believe in
good luck. Our results are in accordance with previous research
that narcissists who believe in good luck are overconfident
(Darke and Freedman, 1997b; Jones, 2013), which causes them to
exhibit cognitive biases in success or penalty perceptions about
corruption (Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2007; Lakey et al., 2008).
In addition, narcissists possess an overly positive self-concept
(Lakey et al., 2008), leading them to acquire a control illusion
such that they believe that they could control their corrupt
actions (Farwell and Wohlwend-Lloyd, 1998; Jones, 2013). This
would further exacerbate their irrational beliefs in good luck.
Research has shown that perceived behavioral control influence
one’s corrupt intention (Rabl and Kuhlmann, 2008). If narcissists
believe that they will have a good luck and can control the
whole corrupt event, they would self-aggrandize the likelihood
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FIGURE 6 | Indirect effect of belief in good luck on the link between psychopathy and bribe-taking intention. **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.001.
of success and downplay the likelihood of penalty. Even when
faced with opposite facts, it seems that they still hold the illusory
belief that things will go as they wish. Thus, in support of
our Hypothesis 2, narcissists hold good luck belief and have a
tendency to overestimate their chances of winning via bribe-
offering, even though the chance is very low; and underestimate
the probability of being penalized for bribe-taking, even though
the odds are very high; which would drive them to engage in
corrupt behaviors.
Additionally, as predicted, people with high psychopathy tend
to engage in corruption. These results furnished preliminary
evidence that the erratic antisocial and reckless nature of
psychopathy easily lead them to engage in corrupt behaviors
(Jones, 2013). Psychopathic individuals with lower self-control
(Tangney et al., 2004) cannot resist the temptation of corruption.
Lured by potential gains, such individuals seem to be willing to
involve in corruption. In addition, mediational data demonstrate
that the effect of psychopathy on corrupt intention is partially
explained by an irrational belief in good luck. Individuals high
in psychopathy cannot regulate impulses effectively and easily
create irrational beliefs in good luck in seeking gains or avoiding
penalty, and even view gains or penalty as merely a by-product
of corruption. These findings confirm our hypothesis that
individuals’ psychopathy can positively influence their irrational
beliefs in good luck, which, in turn, partially leads to a higher
corrupt intention.
Implications
Our research brings significant theoretical implications for
the literature on corruption. To our knowledge, this study
is among the first attempts to examine the impact of the
Dark Triad traits on corruption and on the mediating role of
belief in good luck. Firstly, this study extends the preliminary
research on corruption from the perspective of individual
differences and confirms the relationship between each Dark
Triad trait and corruption. Rampant corruption events have
raised questions surrounding the personality traits responsible
for corruption. In other words, do certain personality traits
facilitate corruption? To a certain extent, the current study
seems to have answered this question by revealing that
people with high Dark Triad of personality are more easily
engage in corruption. Secondly, the present study furthered the
research on the theory of planned behavior, and encourages
researchers to understand the occurrence of corruption by
providing insight into the underlying psychological mechanisms
between the Dark Triad of personality and corruption. The
mediating role of belief in good luck helps reveal the reason
why the Dark Triad traits facilitate corruption. Thirdly, these
findings also enrich the studies on the prospect theory and
establish that people’s decisions about the negative or deviant
events are not independent of outcome valences once the
probabilities are specified. In the present study, we redefined
the concept of belief in good luck by using an adapted
research paradigm of “objective probability event-subjective
probability estimation,” and confirmed its two mechanisms by
examining the two different outcome valences of corruption
forms.
It is noteworthy that this study was also pragmatic because it
provided some anti-corruption measures. First, at the individual
level, although one’s personality cannot be easily changed, if
individuals could be aware that their personality predisposes
them to generate unrealistic beliefs in good luck and to engage
in corrupt behaviors, then they could take more positive
steps to deter them. Second, at the government level, the
knowledge that the Dark Triad and irrational beliefs in good
luck are associated with corrupt intention can help anti-
corruption agencies and institutions become more effective
in their actions of restraining corruption. In view of the
mediating role of luck beliefs, anti-corruption policies should
focus on inhabiting people’s irrational beliefs in corruption.
For those with high Dark Triad tendencies, the government
can decrease their corrupt behaviors by discouraging their
irrational belief in good luck in corruption through some ways.
For example, creating a fair competition environment is the
permanent solution to reduce the necessity of offering bribe
and to decrease the probability of gaining profits via bribe-
offering. This will encourage people to win competitions or
seek benefits through appropriate means. In addition, extensively
exposing people to the information about anti-corruption
policies (Song and Cheng, 2012), such as the severe penalty
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policy, can help them be acutely aware of the huge cost of
engaging in corruption. That is, both bribe recipients and payers
should be penalized heavily. Therefore, stepping up penalties
for bribe-offering is also imperative for curbing corruption in
China.
Limitations and Prospects
There is no doubt that this study has several limitations. First
of all, the cross-sectional data and correlational design does not
allow us to detect the causal link between the Dark Triad of
personality, belief in good luck, and corruption. Longitudinal
studies should be conducted to replicate these findings in
future. Second, it is also important to note that although self-
report measures are widely used and the instruments employed
in present study have good reliability, a response bias and
common-method bias are still inevitable. Third, measures of
corruption were based on the hypothetical scenarios, which
may not reflect actual corrupt behaviors. Thus, the ecological
validity of the assessment may be affected. Future research can
develop alternative tools to bring research results closer to actual
behaviors. Fourth, we should point out that our conclusions are
based on the mediation model that we examined with each of
the three Dark Triad traits as a predictor variable, belief in good
luck as a mediator variable, and corrupt intention as a dependent
variable. Although, our results supported the causal processes
proposed in the hypothesis development sections, this study did
not test the competing models, and therefore, the alternative
models and alternative mediators (e.g., moral disengagement)
need to be identified in future studies. Finally, the moderator
variables between the Dark Triad of personality and corruption
also need to be investigated to uncover the boundary conditions,
whichmay help us understand the extent to which the Dark Triad
of personality increases corruption.
CONCLUSIONS
This study contributes to the emerging literature concerning
the occurrence of corruption from the perspective of individual
factors, and the findings hold substantive implications, both
theoretical and practical. Using some hypothetical scenarios of
corruption in the Chinese context, the two sub-studies in the
current study not only present evidence that people with high
Dark Triad tendencies are more likely to engage in corruption,
but also support the role of their irrational beliefs in good luck
as a mediator in this association. We hope that this study can
provide some new insights and offer a valuable foundation for
the future research on corruption.
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